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Abstract
We study the effect of the drop out and reenter information in an environment where bidders‟
values involve both private and common value components. We find that (1) providing bidding
information does not have a significant effect on expected revenue and expected efficiency. (2) The
effect of information on winner‟s expected profit depends on the range of uncertainty of the
common value component and the level of Nash profit prediction, which the auctioneer has no a
priori knowledge. In our environment, where bidders have a private component to their value and
the auction takes place in ascending clock format, (3) bidders do not suffer from the winner‟s curse
when information is not provided. (4) Information substantially increases the variability of revenue
and winner‟s profit when the range of uncertainty of the common value component is large. (5)
Bidders‟ response to information depends on the range of uncertainty.
JEL Code: D44
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1. Introduction

In an ascending price auction, when values are interdependent, bidders can use bidding
information concerning when other bidders drop out of the auction to form an estimate of their
own value for the object. This suggests that the prices at which others drop out might become an
integral part of a bidder‟s decision process in such an auction. The concern for controlling bidding
information in auctions arises from the dilemma that, on one hand, bidding information can assist
bidders in estimating the value of the auctioned items and increase auction revenue, but, on the
other hand, bidding information can facilitate and sustain collusive outcomes, especially in
multi-object environment. Because of these opposing effects on auction performance the problem
of controlling bidding information is a two-edged sword (Cramton, 1998). In fact, this was exactly
the major concern when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was considering whether
to disclose bidding information.

“The FCC could have hindered collusion by revealing only the bid amounts between rounds, and
not the bidders’ identities. It chose not to do this in the broadband auction and instead gave out
full details of each round’s bidding, because it judged that the risk of collusion was outweighed by
benefits of the information.”
-- McAfee and McMillian, “Analyzing the Airwaves Auction”, 1996.

However, is information really beneficial to bidders in ascending auctions? This is the major
question to be addressed in this paper.

The major support for providing bidding information in auctions comes from the theoretical result
that when bidders‟ signals concerning the value of the object are affiliated, English auctions
generate more revenue than sealed bid auctions (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). However, laboratory
evidence does not fully confirm this result. Levin et al. (1996) show that when bidders are
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inexperienced, English auctions generate less revenue than first price sealed bid auctions; winning
bidders earn more in English auctions. English auctions generate more revenue for sellers only
when bidders become experienced. Under a specific environment1, Kirchkamp and Moldovanu
(2004) show theoretically and with experiments that English auctions generate higher efficiency,
the same revenue for the seller and higher profit for the winning bidder, when compared to second
price sealed bid auctions.

Goeree and Offerman (2003) show that, under the assumption that bidders‟ signals are independent,
expected efficiency, revenue and winner‟s profit are the same under both English and sealed bid
auctions in an environment with both private and common value components.2 In other words, this
model provides theoretical support for the proposition that bidding information is not beneficial to
auction performance. If the proposition turns out to be supported by the experimental results, it
provides the evidence for auction designers to reevaluate the impression that “information is
beneficial” when the current environment is under consideration in practice. Otherwise, depending
on the results, further research under different environments should be carried out. To understand
the effect of bidding information in ascending auctions, we conduct experiments that examine this
theory‟s validity.

We consider an English „clock‟ auction with reentry (EWR).

At the beginning of the auction,

price is set at a very low level. The auctioneer continuously raises the price and bidders simply
determine whether to remain active (continue to demand) or drop out. The drop out decision is
revocable meaning that a bidder can later choose to demand at a higher price even though he
“dropped out” at a lower price. (In the treatment with full information the drop out and reenter

In their setting, there are three bidders, each bidder‟s value depends on his own signal plus a parameter times the
signal of his right hand side bidder (imagine the bidders are sitting at a round table).
2
The properties of auction models with both private and common value components have also been discussed by
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Maskin (1992), Jackson (2005), Mikoucheva and Sonin
(2004) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000).
1
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decisions would be announced to all bidders.) The auctioneer awards the item to the last bidder
who remains active in the auction. In the traditional English clock auction model, where bidders‟
decisions are irrevocable (Milgrom and Weber, 1982), only bidders remaining active in the auction
can take advantage of the information revealed by previous drop out bidders. However, EWR
allows bidders who have already dropped out to take advantage of the information revealed by
bidders who drop out later, therefore, all bidding information can be utilized by every bidder in the
auction.

We examine bidding information as a treatment effect in the EWR3 because a lack of testable
empirical evidence leaves auctioneers uncertain about how much information to provide bidders.
The experimental design, which will be discussed in detail later, consists of one treatment where
bidders have no knowledge about how many and which bidders remain active (no information
case), and another treatment where bidders know the exact identity of the active bidders at each
price (full information case). Our results show that providing bidding information has no
significant effect on expected revenue or expected efficiency. However, providing bidding
information increases the variability of revenue and winner‟s profit when the uncertainty level of
the common value component is high. Information can have a significant effect on winners‟ profits
depending on the level of common value uncertainty and Nash profit prediction.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the economic environment and auction
institution implemented. Section 3 provides the theoretical predictions and hypotheses to be tested.
Section 4 discusses the experimental design and procedures. Section 5 provides the results. Section
6 concludes.

3

Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) classify open ascending auctions with different levels of information revealed and
possibility of reentry into six categories. They show that when bidding information is totally concealed, the strategies
in auctions with and without reentry allowed are isomorphic for more than two bidders.
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2. The Environment and Auction Design

We consider an auction which allocates a single object among n bidders. Bidders‟ values for the
object are comprised of both common and private value components. Each bidder has a common
value signal ci (i indexes the bidder) and a private value pi. The common value, C, which is
unknown to bidders at the time of bidding, is the arithmetic mean of the n common value signals
(C 

1 n
 ci ). The actual value vi of the object for each bidder is the common value plus the
n i 1

bidder‟s private value, i.e., vi = C + pi. Bidders who are not allocated the object earn zero profit
while the bidder who is allocated the object (winner) earns vi minus the auction price.

The object is auctioned-off using an ascending clock auction. A clock, which indicates the current
price of the auctioned object, is initialized at a low price at the beginning of the auction and is
increased through a series of fixed size price increments. At each increment, bidders indicate
whether they are willing to buy (demand) the object at the current price. The clock rises to the next
increment level whenever the number of demanders is greater than 1.

Bidders have two options. One is to indicate that they are willing to buy and the other one is to
indicate that they are not willing to buy at the current price. Bidders can switch between these
two options as long as the auction has not ended. This paper will use the terms „drop out‟ and „exit‟
interchangeably to describe the action of not demanding and use the terms „come back‟ and
„reenter‟ interchangeably to describe the action of demanding again after having exited.

The auction stops when the number of demanders is less than or equal to 1. In the case where the
number of demanders is equal to 1, the object is allocated to the remaining active bidder at the
current price (i.e. the price where the last competing bidder dropped out). In the case where
5

demand is zero (i.e. more than one bidder dropped out at the current price), the winner will be
randomly selected from one of the bidders who dropped out at the current price and he will pay the
previous price.

3. Predictions and Hypotheses

For symmetric equilibria, without loss of generality, we can focus on any one bidder, say bidder 1‟s
bidding strategy. Bidder 1‟s type is defined as t1 

c1
 p1 .4 In the second price sealed bid auction,
n

when bidders are uncertain about their true values, the equilibrium bidding strategy suggests that a
bidder should submit a bid equal to his expected value of the auctioned item assuming that his type
equals the maximum of all other bidders‟ types. If the bidder wins the auction and has to pay what
he bids, he can infer that the highest type of all other bidders is the same as his, which is exactly
what he expects when forming his bidding strategy (see (Krishna, 2002), p.88). Let

y1  max i 2,...,n {

ci
 pi } denote the highest type of the n-1 other bidders. Then bidder 1‟s risk
n

neutral strategy is to bid:

B(x)=E(C+p1|t1=x, y1=x),

(1)

where E is the expected value operator. If each risk neutral bidder follows the strategy defined in
(1), this will be a Nash equilibrium of the second-price auction.5

4

Type t1 is a variable that summarizes the private value signal and common value signal for bidder 1. Goeree and
Offerman (2002, 2003) call it surplus and use s as the notation. Note that bidder 1's true surplus is C+p1, which is
ci
c
equal to 1  p1 
. Since bidder 1's private information is c1 and p1, the first order condition for profit
n
n
i 1



maximization, the actual private information that determines bidder 1's profit is t1 
5

c1
 p1 .
n

Derivation can be found in Goeree and Offerman (2003).
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For the ascending clock auction with reentry and with no bidding information, the Nash
equilibrium bid function will be the same as that in (1). The intuition is simple.

Suppose all

other bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy in (1). During the auction and before the
price reaches B, bidder 1 is unable to infer the types of any other bidders because he does not know
at what prices they dropped out of the auction. If he tries to infer the type of others by temporarily
dropping out before reaching B, there are two possibilities. Either the auction stops immediately, or
the clock price will continue to rise. If it stops, bidder 1 may have lost to someone with a lower
type than himself and forgone some profit because he dropped out before B.
learned nothing.

If it rises, he has

If bidder 1 drops out at B and sees that the price is still moving up, he can infer

that there are at least two bidders with types higher than himself. Since winning the auction with
the type that is not the highest is not expected to be profitable6, bidder 1 should not reenter the
auction. By the same token, bidder 1 should not drop out later than B.

Thus, without bidding information, the ascending clock auction and the second price auction are
isomorphic7.

In the ascending clock auction, when bidders are uncertain about their true values, the equilibrium
bidding strategy is recursively defined. When no bidder has dropped-out, a bidder keeps
demanding the item until the price reaches his expected value assuming that his type equals all
other n-1 bidders‟ types. This is to assure that if all bidders drop out at the same price, the bidder
who is allocated the item pays the price equal to what he expects when forming his bidding
strategy. After the first bidder drops out, other bidders infer his type from his drop out price and
reformulate their expected value of the item using this new piece of information and assuming that
6

The expected profit of winner is t1-t2, where t1 is the highest type and t2 is the second highest type.
Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) prove the same result in their common value model. Similar to us, they use the mean
of all bidders‟ common value signals as the value for all bidders. The differences are that they do not consider a private
value component and the bidders‟ signals are strictly affiliated.
7
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their types equal all other n-2 bidders‟ types. This strategy is recursively defined for the remaining
n-1 bidders (see (Krishna, 2002), p.91).

Thus, the symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for the ascending clock auction with bid
information is given by:

B0 ( x)  E (c1  p1 | t1  x, y1  x,..., y n 1  x),
nk
E (c1 | t1  x, y1  x,..., y n  k 1  x)
n
1 k 1
 E ( p1 | t1  x, y1  x,..., y n  k 1  x)   E[c1 | Bi (t1 ;b1 ,..., bi )  bi 1 ]
n i 0

Bk ( x; b1 ,..., bk ) 

(2)

where Bk ( x; b1 ,..., bk ) is the highest price bidder 1 is willing to pay in the auction given his type t1=x
and that k bidders have dropped out at the prices b1,…,bk.8

When bidding information is provided in the ascending clock auction with reentry, nothing
changes. Whenever a bidder exits (not demanding the object at the current price), other bidders
infer his type from his exiting price. Whenever the bidder reenters into the auction, other bidders
can change their inference of the reentering bidder‟s type as if he has never exited before. Using
equation (2), bidders change their bidding strategy of Bk(x;b1,…bk) to Bk-1(x;b1,…,bi-1,bi+1,…bk).
Therefore, bidders have no way to affect other bidders‟ valuations by exiting then reentering the
auction.9

When considering whether a bidder would deviate from the equilibrium strategy, it is essential to
consider whether it would be profitable to do so. Under the current auction setting, bidders cannot
benefit from exiting without reentry because the profit of not winning is 0. Since exiting with
reentry does not affect the valuations of other bidders, exiting earlier is not profitable. How about
8

Derivation can be found in Goeree and Offerman (2003).
Izmalkov (2003) shows that bidders are unable to earn additional profit by temporary exit in a revocable exit
auction.
9

8

exiting later? A bidder can potentially earn a positive profit only by delaying his exit until he
becomes the winner of the auction. Note that each Bk is strictly increasing in x. This implies that
winner has the highest type. Suppose t2 is the highest type. Bidder 1, who has t1, delays his exit and
becomes the winner. Suppose all bidders except bidder 1 follow the bidding strategy in equation
(2). Upon winning, bidder 1‟s expected profit is t1  1 / ni 1 E (c | t  ti 1 )  Bn2 (t2 ) where Bn-2(t2)
n 1

can be written as
(1 / n)i 2 E (c | t  t i 1 )  (2 / n) E (c | t  t 2 )  E ( p | t  t 2 ) . Therefore, bidder 1‟s expected profit is
n 1

t1  (1 / n) E(c | t  t2 )  (2 / n) E(c | t  t2 )  E( p | t  t2 )  t1  t2 . Since t2 is the highest type, bidder

1‟s expected profit is negative.

Suppose bidder 1 bids according to equation (2) and determines to exit at price level B. If bidder 1
drops out at B and sees that the price is still moving up, the equilibrium bidding strategy suggests
that he should not reenter the auction because the outcome implies that he is not holding the
highest type. In this equilibrium, the expected profit from winning, if a bidder does not have the
highest type, is negative.10

Therefore, the strategy in the ascending clock auction with bidding information is the same as the
strategy in the English auction.

Goeree and Offerman (2003) prove that the expected efficiency, winner‟s profit and seller‟s
revenue are the same under second price sealed bid auction and English auction in the
common/private value environment we have posed. We demonstrated the intuition that, although
provided with the reentry option, bidders should not utilize the reentry feature. When bidding
information is provided, the equilibrium bidding strategy follows the one in English auction and
10

Harstad and Rothkopf (2000) use similar argument for the equivalence of equilibrium bidding strategy under
“Alternating Recognition” English auction model with and without reentry.

9

when bidding information is not provided, the equilibrium bidding strategy follows the one in
second price sealed bid auction. Putting these conditions together we form the following
hypotheses:

H1: RevenueNoInfo = RevenueInfo = RevenueNash
H2: Winner‟s profitNoInfo = Winner‟s profitInfo = Winner‟s profitNash
H3: EfficiencyNoInfo = EfficiencyInfo = EfficiencyNash
H4: Number of ReentriesNoInfo = Number of ReentriesInfo = 0

Testing the first three hypotheses answers questions concerning whether bidding information is
beneficial in ascending auctions and whether theory well predicts those outcomes. Testing the last
hypothesis allows us to understand whether the bidders‟ behavior closely follows the theoretical
prediction that reentry has no strategic value.

When a bidder fails to incorporate the negative information that others dropping out implies, he
could fall prey into the winner‟s curse which cannot be accounted for in the equilibrium bidding
strategy because the latter assumes fully rational behavior. Previous laboratory results suggest that
bidders fall prey to the winner‟s curse more seriously when bidding information is not provided:
we will see whether this phenomenon continues in our environment.

4. Experimental Design

The motivation for this research is to study the effect of disclosing bidding information in an
auction environment where bidders are uncertain about the value of the auctioned object. Based on
the auction format discussed in section 2, two treatments regarding information are conducted. In
one information treatment, bidders are only informed about the current clock price of the object

10

being auctioned (No bid Information is provided (NI)). In other words, bidders only know whether
there is excess demand or not at the previous price level. In the second information treatment
bidders are provided with the identity of bidders who demanded the object at each clock price (Full
bidder Information (FI)). These two information treatments are tested against two levels of the
common value signal range, creating less or more uncertainty in the common value portion of the
item‟s value. In one treatment, the common value signals are uniformly distributed between 475
and 525, that is ci ~U[475,525] (small range (SR)). In the other treatment, the common value
signals are uniformly distributed between 425 and 575, that is ci ~U[425,575] (large range (LR)).
Since the Nash predicted earnings are different under different common value signal ranges, the
exchange rates were chosen11 such that the expected earnings in US dollars were the same under
the different ranges. The treatments are summarized in table 1.

Each session used 4 subjects (n=4) who participated in a sequence of 20 auctions. The same set of
private value signals were used for the nth auction in all sessions. Private values were uniformly
distributed from 475 to 525, i.e., pi ~U[475, 525], which is the same as the distribution of common
value signals in the SR treatment.

[Table 1 here]

The common value signals in SR and LR were correlated through a mean preserving algorithm.
For each auction in the SR sessions, a set of common value signals was drawn. Let csr represent a
common value signal in the small range and let clr represent the corresponding common value
signal

in

the

large

range.

csr

is

transformed

to

clr

using

this

formula

clr=(csr-500)x((575-425)/(525-475))+500. This is to ensure that the difference between each signal

11

The currencies used in the experiment are e-dollars. In the SR treatment, e-dollars are converted to US dollar at the
rate of 2 e-dollars=1 US dollar. In the LR treatment, e-dollars are converted to US dollar at the rate of 3 e-dollars=1
US dollar.
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and the means of SR and LR relative to their ranges are identical and prevent inconsistent results
due to different random draws in different ranges.

All private and common value signals were rounded to the nearest integer. The sets of common
value signals under SR/NI and SR/FI are the same and the set of common value signals under
LR/NI and LR/FI are the same.

Subjects were recruited from the student population of George Mason University. When each
session was ready to begin, each subject was assigned a seat at a visually isolated computer
terminal from which they made their decisions during the session. Each subject was given a set of
instructions and scratch paper. Instructions were read aloud by the session monitor12. After reading
the instructions, subjects participated as bidders in two trial auctions (no earnings). This was to
familiarize them with the auction software.

At the beginning of each session, subjects were endowed with either 50 (in SR) or 75 (in LR)
e-dollars as their initial bank balance. Each subject‟s earnings from each subsequent auction (either
positive or negative) were added to or subtracted from his bank balance. If any subject‟s bank
balance reached zero (bankruptcy), the monitor ended the session. The subject who went bankrupt
was paid the $7 USD show-up fee. Each subject who did not go bankrupt was paid the $7 USD
show-up fee plus the cash equivalent of his bank balance.

In each auction, each subject was randomly allocated a bidder ID (1, 2, 3 or 4) to reduce any
repeated game effects. At the beginning of each auction, bidders were privately told their private
and common value signals. Then, the clock started to rise at a rate of 1 e-dollar per second. Bidders
were provided the identities of all bidders demanding at each price under the FI treatment. Bidders
12

The instructions for the SR/FI treatment is in the Appendix.
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made their decisions using two buttons. One button indicated their willingness to buy at the current
price and the other indicated their willingness not to buy at the current price. (A screen shot of the
bidders‟ computer interface is provided in Appendix)13. The bidders were assumed to carry over
their decisions from one price level to the next. At the end of each auction, bidders were told the
common value of the object, and to whom it was allocated at the final price. Bidders were
informed of only their own profit earned in each auction and not the profits of others. There were
20 auctions held in each session but bidders were not informed of this until the final auction ended.

Every auction each bidder was given a piece of information called the “Will Lose Point” that
showed the bidder his highest possible value for the auction object. It was simply calculated as a
function of each bidder‟s own private information and the assumption that all other bidders had
received the highest possible common value signal (525 for SR treatments and 575 for LR
treatments). If the bidder bought at a price beyond this point, he would make a loss for sure,
though it was likely that he would make a loss at prices significantly lower than this point
depending on the common value draws of the other bidders.

5. Results

A total of 18 sessions were run (5 sessions for each SR treatment and 4 sessions for each LR
treatment14). In only 3 sessions out of 18 was a bankruptcy recorded. One bankruptcy occurred at
the 19th auction during a session of the SR/FI treatment. Another occurred at the 4th auction during
a session of the LR/NI treatment. And the third occurred at the 15th auction during a session of the

We used the term “group value” to refer to common value, “group value signal” to refer to common value signal
and “individual value to refer to private value in the experiment.
14
The original design was to have 4 sessions for each treatment. However, substantial variation among sessions was
found in the SR treatments. We suspected that it might because of session effect and decided to collect more data for
the SR treatment.
13
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SR/NI treatment.15 Results 1, 2 and 3 below focus on the performance of revenue, winner‟s profit
and efficiency respectively. Each of them provides the result comparing FI and NI and actual
auction performance relative to the Nash prediction. In the linear mixed effects models that support
the results, auctions are indexed by r and sessions are indexed by j. Informationj =1 if full
information is provided in session j and 0 otherwise. Auction_noj is the auction number in session j.
αj, the random effect for session j, and εrj, are error terms that are assumed to be distributed
normally with a zero mean. Result 4 reports the effect of bidding information on bidders‟ reentry.
Result 5 answers whether there is any relationship between reentry activities and winners‟ profits.
All data are reported in terms of e-dollars.

Result 1a. Providing bidding information has no effect on revenue.

Support. The hypothesis that revenue under NI treatment equals to revenue under FI treatment is
tested using the following linear mixed effects model for SR and LR separately:

Revenuerj     j  1 Informatio n j   2 ( Predicted _ price r  Predicted _ price )
  3 ( Auction _ no j  10)
  4 Informatio n j  ( Predicted _ price r  Predicted _ price )

(3)

  5 Informatio n j  ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj

Revenuerj is the price that winner paid in auction r in session j. Predicted_pricer is the Nash
equilibrium price prediction in auction r and Predicted _ price is the mean predicted price.
Predicted_pricer is added to the model to explain the movement of revenue due to the difference of
equilibrium price across auctions. For sessions without information, equilibrium prices are

15

Because the bidder who went bankrupt in the SR/NI treatment reported that the reason he went bankrupt was that he
was busy calculating and forgot to pay attention to the bidding screen, data from the 15th period has not been used in
our analysis.

14

calculated based on the second price sealed bid equilibrium bidding strategy. For sessions with
information, equilibrium prices are calculated based on equilibrium bidding strategy of English
auction.α is the intercept of the model, which represents the expected mean revenue at auction 10
of NI treatment when evaluated at the average predicted price (1002.15 for SR and 991.44 for LR).
If information has no effect on revenue, 1 ,  4 and  5 will not be significantly different from 0
and the joint hypothesis that 1 =  4 =  5 =0 will not be rejected. Results are shown in Table 2.

[Table 2 here]

It is clear that the effect of bidding information on revenue is insignificant (the hypothesis that

1 =  4 =  5 =0 cannot be rejected for both SR and LR).
We observed that auction number can partially explain the movement of revenue in NI and FI of
SR and in FI of LR (  3 is significantly different from 0 for SR at a 10% level, and the joint
hypothesis that  3 +  5 =0 is rejected at a 1% level for SR and at a 10% level for LR). Since this
observation is not predicted by the theory, it leads us to test the hypothesis that the winning bid
equals the Nash prediction (see result 1b). ◆

Result 1b. Actual revenue is significantly different from the Nash revenue prediction in SR/NI at a
10% level; it is significantly different from the Nash revenue prediction in LR/NI at a 5% level and
in SR/FI and LR/FI at a 1% level.

Support. We test the hypothesis that revenue equals to the Nash prediction using the following
linear mixed effects model for each SR/NI, SR/FI, LR/NI and LR/FI treatments:

Revenuerj  Predicted _ pricer     j  1 ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj

(4)

15

α is the intercept of the model, which represents the expected difference between actual revenue
and the Nash predicted price in auction 10. The definition of other variables follows that in model
(3). If the actual price is not different from the Nash prediction, we would expect that the joint
hypothesis that  = 1 =0 will not be rejected. Results are shown in Table 3. The p-values of the
joint hypothesis  = 1 =0 are 0.0709, 0.0000, 0.0483 and 0.0035 for SR/NI, SR/FI, LR/NI and
LR/FI respectively. ◆

[Table 3 here]

Although information does not have an effect on revenue in general, the repeated nature of the
experiment tends to lower revenue in SR and this tendency is more severe when bidding
information is provided. From table 3, 1 =-0.4 for SR/NI and 1 =-0.87 for SR/FI. The negative
sign of these two coefficients shows that relative to the predicted revenue, actual revenue is
decreasing through out the experiment. Combined with the intercept term, these estimates show
that at the beginning of the experiment (i.e. auction 1), actual revenue is higher than the predicted
one (expected difference is -1.16+(-0.4)(-9)=2.44 for SR/NI and 0.82+(-0.87)(-9)=8.65 for SR/FI).
The situation reverses near the end of the experiment (at auction 20, the expected difference is
-1.16+(-0.4)(10)=-5.16 for SR/NI and 0.82+(-0.87)(10)=-7.88 for SR/FI). The rate of revenue
decrease in FI is more than double the rate in NI.

In LR/NI, the actual revenue is lower than the predicted one at the beginning of the experiment (at
auction 1, expected difference is -9.96+(1.12)(-9)=-20.04) and gradually increases and becomes
higher than the Nash predicted (at auction 20, expected difference is -9.96+(1.12)(10)=1.24). In
LR/FI, the actual revenue is lower than the predicted one through out the experiment (at auction 1,
expected difference is -19.93+(1.77)(-9)=-35.86 and at auction 20, expected difference is
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-19.93+(1.77)(10)=-2.23) .

One possible explanation of the reverse tendency of actual revenue relative to predicted in SR and
LR is that since common value uncertainty in SR is low, bidders become “comfortable” bidding in
SR more quickly and therefore the auctions become highly competitive earlier in the experiment.
Because of the repeated nature of the experiment, bidders gradually realize that bidding
aggressively hurts their profits and they lower their bids; they learn this faster when bidding
information is provided. On the other hand, because of the high common value uncertainly in LR,
bidders tend to bid cautiously at the beginning of the experiment and the initial auctions are far
from competitive; bidders gradually become familiar with the environment and become more
competitive. It is interesting to notice that when bidding information is provided, bidders are
bidding more aggressive at the beginning of the experiment in SR (comparing expected difference
of actual and predicted revenue of 2.44 for SR/NI and of 8.65 for SR/FI at auction 1); while in LR,
bidders are bidding more cautiously when information is provided (comparing expected difference
of actual and predicted revenue of -20.04 for LR/NI and of -34.73 for LR/FI at auction 1).
Interestingly, this suggests that bidders‟ reaction to information is not uniform; it depends on the
size of the uncertainty (the range of the common value signal).

While examining the fitted model for result 1a, we found that the model for LR needs to be
corrected for heteroscedasticity in terms of different information treatments. This leads us to
suspect that the variability of revenue in different information treatments is different.

Result 1c. The variance of difference between actual revenue and predicted revenue is
substantially larger in FI than in NI for LR. However, it is essentially the same in FI and NI for SR.

Support. The variance of error for model (4) is reported in table 3.  2 is 94.38 and 94.09 for
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SR/NI and SR/FI respectively. However,  2 increases by 84.7% from 502.52 for LR/NI to
928.29 for LR/FI. ◆

Result 1c complements the discussion in result 1b suggesting that bidders react to information
differently under different range of uncertainty. Result 2a and 2c give further support to this insight
from the winner‟s profit perspective.

Result 2a. The magnitude of the effect of information depends on the level of Nash predicted profit.
In the small range treatment, when the level of the Nash predicted profit increases, profits increase
faster than when there is no information provided. Just the opposite occurs in the large range
treatment.

Support. The hypothesis that winner‟s profit under NI treatment equals to winner‟s profit under FI
treatment is tested using the following linear mixed effects model for SR and LR separately:

Profit rj     j  1 Informatio n j   2 ( Predicted _ profit r  Predicted _ profit )
  3 ( Auction _ no j  10)
  4 Informatio n j  ( Predicted _ profit r  Predicted _ pofit )

(5)

  5 Informatio n j  ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj

Profitrj is the profit earned by the winner in auction r in session j. Predicted_Profitr is the actual
value of the predicted winner minus the equilibrium price predicted in auction r.

Predicted _ profit is the mean predicted profit. α is the intercept of the model, which is the
expected profit in auction 10 of NI when predicted profit is 6.44 for SR and is 8.17 for LR. If
information has no effect on winner‟s profit, we would expect that 1 ,  4 and  5 are individually
insignificantly different from 0 and that the joint hypothesis test that 1 =  4 =  5 =0 cannot be
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rejected. Results are shown in Table 4.

[Table 4 here]

Results show that information has a significant effect on revenue in SR but not in LR (hypothesis
test of 1 =  4 =  5 =0 has a p-value of 0.0269 and 0.2396 for SR and LR respectively). Results
indicate that the effect of information depends on the predicted profit;  4 has a low p-value of
0.0058 and 0.0556 for SR and LR respectively. Providing information generates different levels of
profit for winners when the predicted profit varies. Notice that when the predicted profit is greater,
actual profit is greater (  2 is positive). Because  4 is positive and significant (at the 1% level) in
the SR treatment, the data suggests that when the predicted profit is greater, the actual profit is
greater if information is provided. The top panel of figure 1 is a scatter plot of Nash predicted
profit versus actual profit in the SR treatment. The fitted regression lines for FI and NI indicate that
the actual profit under FI is less than that under NI for lower values of predicted profit, but FI
profit surpasses NI profit as the Nash prediction increases.

[Figure 1 here]

Because  4 is negative and significant (at the 10% level) in the LR treatment, the data also
suggests that when the predicted profit is greater, the actual profit is lower if information is
provided. The bottom panel of figure 1 is a scatter plot of Nash predicted profit versus actual profit
in the LR treatment. The fitted regression lines for FI and NI indicate that the actual profit under
NI is less than that under FI for lower values of predicted profit, but NI profit surpasses FI profit as
the Nash prediction increases.

Results further indicate that actual profit can be partially explained by auction number in the
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information treatment (the joint hypothesis test of  3 +  5 =0 gives a very low p-value of 0.0248
for the SR model). This leads us to test the hypothesis that profit equals the Nash prediction (see
result 2b). ◆

Although this result cannot tell us the specific effect information will have on the winner‟s profit
when considering whether information should be provided during a particular auction, it provides
insights into the interaction of information and the level of predicted profit. Specifically, it
suggests what auction format (whether information is provided) a bidder might prefer. Consider a
bidder who thinks that the range of uncertainty is small and the Nash predicted profit is high; he
would rather participate in an ascending auction where information is provided because the actual
profit can be expected to be higher. If he thinks that the Nash predicted profit is low, he would
prefer an ascending auction where no information is disclosed. The bidder will make opposite
choices if he thinks that the range of uncertainty is large. This line of reasoning is summarized by
the following table:

[Table 5 here]

Result 2b. While actual profit is not significantly different from the Nash profit prediction in SR/NI
and LR/NI, it is significantly different from the Nash profit prediction in SR/FI and in LR/FI.

Support. We test the hypothesis that actual profit equals the Nash prediction using the following
linear mixed effects model for each SR/NI, SR/FI, LR/NI and LR/FI treatment:

Profit rj  Predicted _ Profit r     j  1 ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj

(6)

α is the intercept of the model, which represents the expected difference between actual profit and
20

the Nash predicted profit in auction 10. The definition of other variables follows that in model (5).
If the actual profit is not different from the Nash prediction, we would expect the joint hypothesis
test that  = 1 =0 cannot be rejected.

Results are shown in Table 6. Results show that actual

profit is not statistically significantly different from the Nash predicted profit in SR/NI and LR/NI,
but it is statistically significantly different from Nash predicted profit in SR/FI at a 1% level and in
LR/FI at a 10% level. ◆

Bidders on average earn higher than Nash predicted profit in all auctions in LR/FI (table 6 shows
that model (4) estimates  to be 13.54 and estimate 1 to be insignificantly different from 0). Result
2b shows that bidders do not suffer from winner‟s curse in SR/NI, LR/NI and LR/FI.16 Figure 2
shows a box plot of average profit compared with Nash prediction under different treatments. We
can see that in the LR condition, even when bidding information is not provided, bidders earn
more than the Nash prediction. In the SR condition bidders earn close to the Nash prediction when
information is not provided. Although bidders earn less than Nash prediction in SR/FI, they earn a
positive profit on average. The result of not suffering from winners‟ curse is contrary to results
from pure common value environments (Kagel and Levin, 1996)17 and the experimental analysis
of first price seal bid auctions under an environment with both private and common value
components (Goeree and Offerman, 2002). This suggests that the simultaneous conditions of
having a private value component in the bidder‟s valuation function and using an ascending

16

Kagel (1995) defines the deviation from bidding above the expected value given one has the highest signal value
as a measure of the extent a bidder suffers from winner‟s curse. Nash equilibrium predicts that a bidder bids assuming
that all remaining bidders‟ are the same as him when information is provided and his signal is the same as the second
highest one when information is not provided. This condition is more stringent than the expected value condition. In
other words, a bidder following the Nash bidding would bid lower than what he would have bid by simply avoiding
the winner‟s curse. And a bidder who bids simply by avoiding the winner‟s curse would earn less profit than the one
who follows Nash strategy. Since the actual profits our bidders earned were not significantly different from the Nash
predictions in SR/NI and LR/NI, and even higher in LR/FI, we conclude that our bidders do not suffer from winner‟s
curse in these conditions.
17
Kagel and Levin (1996) report inexperienced and one-time experienced bidders earn negative profit on average in
English auctions in a common value environment. Note that there is a subtle difference between how the common
value signals are determined in (Kagel and Levin, 1996) and in this paper. While bidders‟ common value signals are
independent in this paper, the signals in (Kagel and Levin, 1996) are affiliated (as defined in (Milgrom and Weber,
1982)).
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auction are necessary to help bidders avoid the winner‟s curse.

[Figure 2 here]

Again, while examining the model for result 2a, we correct the heteroscedasticity in terms of
different information treatments for LR. We suspect the variability of winners‟ profits is different
for NI and FI and report it in the following result.

Result 2c. The variance of difference between actual profit and predicted profit decreases from NI
to FI for SR. However, it substantially increases from NI to FI for LR.

Support. The variance of error for model (6) is reported in table 6.  2 decreases 24.1 % when
comparing SR/NI (150.75) and SR/FI (114.44). However,  2 increases by 80.78% from 616.37
for LR/NI to 1114.25 for LR/FI. ◆

Result 2c again suggests the non-uniform effect of information on auction performance.
Information does not necessarily stabilize bidders‟ earnings. In fact, the variability of winners‟
profits slightly decreases when information is provided in SR. However, the variability of winners‟
profits dramatically increases when information is provided in the LR treatment.

Result 3a. Providing bidding information has no effect on efficiency.

Support. Efficiency is defined as follows:
Efficiency 

v winner
,
v max

where vwinner is the value of the winner (pwinner+C) and vmax is the value of the bidder with the
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maximum private value drawn (pmax+C). The hypothesis that efficiency under NI equals to
efficiency under FI is tested using the following linear mixed effects model for SR and LR
separately18:

Efficiency rj     j  1 Information j   2 ( Auction _ no j  10)
  3 Information j  ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj

(7)

Efficiencyrj is the efficiency in auction r in session j. α is the intercept of the model, which
represents the expected mean efficiency at auction 10 of NI treatment. If information has no effect
on efficiency, we would expect that β1 and  3 are individually insignificantly different from 0 and
that the joint hypothesis test that 1 =  3 =0 cannot be rejected. Results are shown in Table 7.
The test result gives a p-value of 0.7382 for the SR treatment and a p-value of 0.4689 for the LR
treatment. Therefore, the information effect under the two range treatments is insignificant.

◆

[Table 7 here]

Since  2 in table 7 is insignificantly different from 0 for both SR and LR, the efficiency is not
explained by auction number in the NI treatments. However, the hypothesis test that  2 +  3 =0 is
rejected at a 10% level for LR, this indicates that auction number may partially explain efficiency
in LR. We test the hypothesis that efficiency equals the Nash prediction in SR and LR (Result 3b).
Surprisingly, it shows that the theory‟s prediction on efficiency is not good in SR as well.

Result 3b. Actual efficiency is significantly lower than the Nash efficiency prediction in both SR
and LR treatments.
18

Since the Nash predicted efficiency is the same for all periods in SR (equal 1), we encounter singularity problem
when we estimate models that include predicted efficiency as an independent variable. Therefore, we choose a model
different from those we use for estimating revenue and profit. To maintain consistency, we estimated the same model
for SR and LR.
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Support. We test the hypothesis that actual efficiency equals the Nash prediction using the
following linear mixed effects model for each SR/NI, SR/FI, LR/NI and LR/FI treatment:

Efficiency rj  Predicted _ Efficiency r     j  1 ( Auction_no j  10)   rj

Predicted_Efficiencyr is the Nash equilibrium efficiency prediction in auction r. α is the intercept
of the model, which represents the expected difference between actual efficiency and the Nash
predicted efficiency in auction 10. The definition of other variables follows that in model (7). If the
actual efficiency is not different from the Nash prediction, we would expect the joint hypothesis
test that  = 1 =0 cannot be rejected. Results are shown in Table 8. We observe that the
hypothesis that actual efficiency is equal to the Nash predicted is rejected at a 1% level for SR/NI
and LR/FI and at a 5% level for SR/FI and LR/NI. ◆

[Table 8 here]

Besides the observation that actual efficiency does not equal to the Nash prediction, we observe,
from table 8, that relative to predicted efficiency, actual efficiency rises along with auction number
in LR/FI ( 1 has a positive estimate and is significantly different from 0). This observation is not
found in other treatments.

We again observe a heteroscedasticity problem in the model estimated in result 3a. In fact, the
variability of efficiency is higher in NI than in FI for SR. However, since the changes in efficiency
are infinitesimal, we choose not to report this result in detail.

Result 4. The number of reentries is not significantly different between FI and NI in both SR and
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LR treatments. However, the number of reentries is significantly greater than 0 in both SR and LR
treatments.

Support. Theory predicts that bidders would not utilize the reentry options under either treatment
and therefore the numbers of reentries under both treatments would equal zero. We formally test
the hypothesis that the numbers of reentries are equal between FI and NI using a two-sided
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. The average number of reentries per subject per auction in a session is
the unit of observation. The number of observations for the SR treatment and LR treatment are 5
and 4 respectively. The test result gives a p-value of 0.3016 for the SR treatment and a p-value of
0.6286 for the LR treatment.

We use a one-sided Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test to test the null hypothesis that the number of
reentries (which cannot be less than zero) per bidder per auction in a session exactly equals zero.
The average number of reentries per bidder per auction in a session is the unit of observation.
Number of observations for the SR treatment and LR treatment are 5 and 4 respectively. The
descriptive statistics and test results for the average number of reentries per bidder per auction are
summarized in table 9. The null hypothesis that the number of reentries in SR equals zero is
rejected at a 5% level (p-value=0.0313 for SR/FI, p-value=0.0313 for SR/NI). The null hypothesis
that the number of reentry in LR equals zero is rejected at a 10% level (p-value=0.0625 for LR/FI,
p-value=0.0625 for LR/NI). ◆

Bidders do make use of reentry when making their decisions: this leads us to enquire whether the
bidder‟s perceived value in reentering manifests itself in increased profit for winners who engage
in such strategy (result 5).

[Table 9 here]
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Result 5. The winners who engage in reentry do not earn higher profit than those who do not
engage in it.

Support. We find that the average normalized profit (actual profit – Nash predicted profit) for
winners who engage in reentry (i.e. reenter at least one time in winning an auction) is higher than
that of the average normalized profit for winners who do not engage in reentry only in the LR/FI
treatment. The difference is insignificant (p-value for two-sided t-test is 0.8048). Figure 3 shows
the average normalized profit in different treatments. The average number of reentries for the
winners who reenter on the way to winning are 1.56, 2, 1.73 and 1.2 for treatments SR/FI, SR/NI,
LR/FI and LR/NI respectively. ◆

[Figure 3 here]

6. Conclusion

The model considered in this paper provides a theoretical proposition that bidding information is
not beneficial to any party in an English auction where objects have a certain private plus uncertain
common component to value. We test the model and find that information alone does not have a
significant effect on expected revenue and expected efficiency. However, information does have an
effect on expected profit when taking into account the range of public uncertainty and the level of
Nash profit prediction, which cannot be known a priori. There is no evidence that bidders suffer
from winners‟ curse when information is not provided in this environment for both small and large
range of uncertainty. In fact, in the treatment where the common value component has a larger
range, winners tend to earn more profit than Nash prediction on average. However, in the smaller
range treatment where information is provided, winners earn slightly less than the Nash prediction
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but their average profit remains positive. We observe that at the beginning of the experiment, the
expected revenue in the information treatment is higher than that of the no information treatment
relative to the predicted revenue when the uncertainty in the common value component is small,
while the opposite occurs when the uncertainty in the common value component is large.
Furthermore, information has no effect on the variability of revenue and decreases the variability
of winners‟ profits when the uncertainty is small, while it substantially increases the variability of
revenue and winners‟ profits when the uncertainty is large. Combined with the information effect
on winners‟ expected profits, these findings suggest that bidders‟ response to information is not
uniform; it depends on the uncertainty level of the common value component. Although a
significant number of reentries is observed, the data do not show that winners who engage in
reentry earn higher profits.

We find no evidence that bidding information is beneficial to auction performance in our
environment. It appears that bidders do not suffer from the winner‟s curse when there is a private
value component in the valuation function combined with an ascending auction. This suggests that
auction designers need not worry much about bidders losing money in open ascending auctions.
The effect of bidding information under different environments still waits to be tested. For
example, auction theory suggests that when bidders‟ signals are affiliated, providing information
will raise more revenue for the seller. A two-signal model in which common value signals are
affiliated is a potential extension of our study.
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Table 1: Treatment Design
Only Clock Price Reported

Bidders‟ Identity Reported

Small Range (SR)

SR/NI

SR/FI

Large Range (LR)

LR/NI

LR/FI

Caption: This 2X2 design relates two Information treatments, one that provides no information concerning
bidder drop-out and reentry decision at each clock price and one that supplies only the clock price; the
second treatment examines the range from which the common value component signals are drawn that is a
mean-preserving spread.
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Table 2: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Revenue

Revenuerj     j  1 Informatio n j   2 ( Predicted _ price r  Predicted _ price )
  3 ( Auction _ no j  10)
  4 Informatio n j  ( Predicted _ price r  Predicted _ price )
  5 Informatio n j  ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj
where  j ~ N (0,  2 ),  rj ~ N (0,  2 )
Estimate

Std. Error

DF

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept (  )

1000.94

1.92

179

521.16

0.0000

Information (  1 )

2.04

2.70

8

0.76

0.4718

(Predicted_price-1002.15) (  2 )

0.96

0.11

179

8.89

0.0000

(Auction_no - 10) (  3 )

-0.41

0.21

179

-1.93

0.0558

(Information x (Predicted_price-1002.15)) (  4 )

-0.24

0.15

179

-1.57

0.1176

Information x (Auction_no - 10) (  5 )

-0.47

0.29

179

-1.61

0.1097

Small Range

H0:

1 =  4 =  5 =0

H0:

 3 +  5 =0

Wald statistic=5.63
t-statistic =-4.35

DF=3

DF=179

p-value=0.1308

p-value=0.0000

Large Range
Intercept (  )

979.49

8.97

132

109.22

0.0000

Information (  1 )

-7.90

12.70

6

-0.62

0.5567

(Predicted_price-991.44) (  2 )

0.42

0.11

132

3.75

0.0003

(Auction_no - 10) (  3 )

0.66

0.60

132

1.09

0.2760

(Information x (Predicted_price-991.44)) (  4 )

-0.17

0.17

132

-1.05

0.2937

Information x (Auction_no - 10) (  5 )

-0.49

0.91

132

0.54

0.5904

H0:

1 =  4 =  5 =0

H0:

 3 +  5 =0

Wald statistic=1.98
t-statistic =1.67

DF=3

DF=132

p-value=0.5761

p-value=0.0977

Caption: Information has no effect on revenue in both small range and large range of the common value
signals. The significance of  3 for small range and the low p-value of the hypothesis test that  3 +  5 =0
for both small range and large range indicate that auction number partially explain actual revenue in both no
information and information treatments.
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Table 3: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for the Difference between Actual Revenue and
Nash Predicted Revenue

Revenuerj  Predicted _ pricer     j  1 ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj
where  j ~ N (0,  2 ),  rj ~ N (0,  2 )
Estimate

Std. Error

DF

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept (  )

-1.16

2.07

88

-0.56

0.5776

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

-0.40

0.18

88

-2.23

0.0280

SR/NI

Estimate of variance of error (   ): 94.38
2

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=5.29

DF=2

p-value=0.0709

SR/FI
Intercept (  )

0.82

1.81

93

0.45

0.6526

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

-0.87

0.17

93

-5.11

0.0000

Estimate of variance of error (   ): 94.09
2

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=26.23

DF=2

p-value=0.0000

LR/NI
Intercept (  )

-9.96

11.85

59

-0.84

0.4039

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

1.12

0.50

59

2.27

0.0271

Estimate of variance of error (   ): 502.52
2

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=6.06

DF=2

p-value=0.0483

LR/FI
Intercept (  )

-19.93

7.96

75

-2.50

0.0145

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

1.77

0.75

75

2.36

0.0207

Estimate of variance of error (   ): 928.29
2

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=11.32

DF=2

p-value=0.0035

Legend: SR: Small range of uncertainty treatment, LR: Large range of uncertainty treatment, NI: No
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment
Caption: The hypothesis that actual revenue equals Nash predicted revenue is rejected at a 10% level for
SR/NI, at a 5% level for LR/NI and at a 1% level for FI in both SR and LR. Relative to predicted revenue,
actual revenue decreases in both NI and FI of SR but increases in LR through out the experiment. Providing
information does not have an effect on the variability of revenue in SR but it substantially increases the
variability of revenue in LR.
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Table 4: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Winner’s Profit

Profit rj     j  1 Informatio n j   2 ( Predicted _ profit r  Predicted _ profit )
  3 ( Auction _ no j  10)
  4 Informatio n j  ( Predicted _ profit r  Predicted _ pofit )
  5 Informatio n j  ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj
where  j ~ N (0,  2 ),  rj ~ N (0,  2 )
Estimate

Std. Error

DF

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept (  )

5.23

1.62

179

3.22

0.0015

Information (  1 )

-1.84

2.27

8

-0.81

0.4419

(Predicted_profit-6.44) (  2 )

0.48

0.12

179

3.96

0.0001

(Auction_no - 10) (  3 )

0.09

0.25

179

0.35

0.7269

(Information x (Predicted_profit-6.44)) (  4 )

0.47

0.17

179

2.79

0.0058

Information x (Auction_no - 10) (  5 )

0.46

0.35

179

1.31

0.1933

Small Range

H0:

1 =  4 =  5 =0

H0:

 3 +  5 =0

Wald statistic=9.19
t-statistic =0.55

DF=3

DF=179

p-value=0.0269

p-value=0.0248

Large Range
Intercept (  )

15.50

8.51

132

1.82

0.0710

Information (  1 )

6.06

12.07

6

0.50

0.6335

(Predicted_profit-8.17) (  2 )

1.37

0.18

132

7.61

0.0000

(Auction_no - 10) (  3 )

-0.32

0.66

132

-0.49

0.6276

Information x (Predicted_profit-8.17) (  4 )

-0.51

0.26

132

-1.93

0.0556

Information x (Auction_no - 10) (  5 )

-0.70

1.01

132

-0.69

0.4893

H0:

1 =  4 =  5 =0

H0:

 3 +  5 =0

Wald statistic=4.21
t-statistic =-1.34

DF=3

DF=132

p-value=0.2396

p-value=0.1814

Caption: For small range of the common value signals, the regression estimates show that information has a
significant effect on profit (Hypothesis 1 =  4 =  5 =0 is rejected). Information has an interaction effect
with Nash predicted profit (p-value of hypothesis  4 =0 is 0.0058). Auction number partially explains
movement of actual profit in information treatment (p-value of hypothesis  3 +  5 =0 is 0.0248).
For large range of the common value signals, the effect of information alone is insignificant. However, there
is an interaction effect between information and the Nash prediction (p-value of hypothesis  4 =0 is 0.0556).
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Table 5: Bidders’ Preferences of Auction Formats given Different Levels of Nash Predicted Profit and
Different Ranges of Uncertainty
High Nash predicted profit

Low Nash predicted profit

Small range of uncertainty (SR)

Full Information (FI) preferred

No Information (NI) preferred

Large range of uncertainty (LR)

No Information (NI) preferred

Full Information (FI) preferred

Caption: The availability of information has an effect on winner‟s profit that is dependent on the level of
Nash profit prediction and the range of uncertainty. A bidder who thinks that the range of uncertainty is
small and the Nash predicted profit is high would rather participate in an ascending auction where
information is provided because the actual profit is higher. If he thinks that the predicted profit is low, he
would prefer an ascending auction where no information is disclosed. The bidder will make opposite
choices if he thinks that the range of uncertainty is large.
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Figure 1:

Actual Profit Plots against Nash Predicted Profit under Small (top panel) and Large

(bottom panel) Range of Uncertainty Treatments.
Small Range Treatment
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Caption: Actual profit is the average of auction profit across sessions. In the small range of uncertainty
treatment, winner‟s profit in full information (FI) treatment is less than winner‟s profit in no information
(NI) initially but it catches up later. In the large range of uncertainty treatment, winner‟s profit in FI is more
than winner‟s profit in NI when predicted profit is less but the results of profit comparison reverses when
predicted profit is large.
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Table 6: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for the Difference between Actual Profit and Nash
Predicted Profit

Profit rj  Predicted _ Profit r     j  1 ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj
where  j ~ N (0,  2 ),  rj ~ N (0,  2 )
Estimate

Std. Error

DF

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept (  )

-1.04

1.72

88

-0.61

0.5464

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

0.27

0.27

88

1.03

0.3048

SR/NI

Estimate of variance of error (   ): 150.75
2

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=1.43

DF=2

p-value=0.4898

SR/FI
Intercept (  )

-3.08

1.52

93

-2.03

0.0450

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

0.56

0.23

93

2.41

0.0181

Estimate of variance of error (   ): 114.44
2

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=9.35

DF=2

p-value=0.0093

LR/NI
Intercept (  )

4.80

12.22

59

0.39

0.6957

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

-0.73

0.55

59

-1.33

0.1898

Estimate of variance of error (   ): 616.37
2

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=1.98

DF=2

p-value=0.3722

LR/FI
Intercept (  )

13.30

6.95

75

1.91

0.0596

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

-0.99

0.78

75

-1.27

0.2098

Estimate of variance of error (   ): 1114.25
2

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=5.00

DF=2

p-value=0.0819

Legend: SR: Small range of uncertainty treatment, LR: Large range of uncertainty treatment, NI: No
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment
Caption: Actual profit is statistically significantly different from the Nash prediction for both SR (at 1%
level) and LR (at 10% level) when bidding information is provided. Relative to Nash profit prediction,
actual profit rises along with auction number for SR/FI (p-value of hypothesis  1 =0 is 0.0181). When
comparing to NI, FI decreases the variability of winner‟s profit in SR. However, it dramatically increases
the variability of winner‟s profit in LR.
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Figure 2: Box Plot of Actual Profit and Nash Predicted Profit
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Caption: Actual profit is the average of profit across all auctions and all sessions. Nash profit is the average
of Nash predictions of each auction. In the large range of uncertainty (LR) treatment, even when bidding
information is not provided (NI), bidders earn more than the Nash prediction on average. In the small range
of uncertainty (SR) treatment bidders earn close to the Nash prediction when information is not provided.
Although bidders earn less than Nash prediction in small range of uncertainty (SR) and full information (FI)
condition, they on average earn positive profit.
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Table 7: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Efficiency

Efficiency rj     j  1 Information j   2 ( Auction _ no j  10)
  3 Information j  ( Auction _ no j  10)   rj
where  j ~ N (0,  2 ),  rj ~ N (0,  2 )
Estimate

Std. Error

DF

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept (  )

0.9966

0.0011

181

875.08

0.0000

Information (  1 )

0.0002

0.0016

8

0.1542

0.8813

(Auction_no - 10) (  2 )

-0.0000006

0.0001

181

-0.0056

0.9956

Information x (Auction_no - 10) (  3 )

-0.0001

0.0001

181

-0.7653

0.4451

Small Range

H0:

1 =  3 =0

Wald statistic=0.61

DF=2

H0:

 2 +  3 =0

t-statistic =-1.30

DF=181

p-value=0.7382
p-value=0.1969

Large Range
Intercept (  )

0.9928

0.0019

134

532.74

0.0000

Information (  1 )

-0.0016

0.0025

6

-0.6311

0.5513

(Auction_no - 10) (  2 )

0.0001

0.0002

134

0.2834

0.7773

Information x (Auction_no - 10) (  3 )

0.0003

0.0003

134

1.0615

0.2904

H0:

1 =  3 =0

Wald statistic=1.51

H0:

 2 +  3 =0

t-statistic =1.89

DF=2

p-value=0.4689

DF=134

p-value=0.0607

Caption: The regression estimates show that information has no effect on efficiency for both small range
and large range of the common value signals. However, the significant result of the hypothesis test of

 2 +  3 =0 for large range of the common value signals suggests that auction number may partially explain
the movement of actual efficiency in information treatment.
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Table 8: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for the Difference between Actual Efficiency and
Nash Predicted Efficiency

Efficiency rj  Predicted _ Efficiency r     j  1 (Auction_no j  10)   rj
where  j ~ N (0,  2 ),  rj ~ N (0,  2 )
Estimate

Std. Error

DF

t-statistic

p-value

Information (  )

-0.0033

0.0006

88

-5.38

0.0000

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

0.000001

0.0001

88

0.01

0.9913

SR/NI

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=28.98

DF=2

p-value=0.0000

SR/FI
Information (  )

-0.0031

0.0014

93

-2.25

0.0268

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

-0.0001

0.0001

93

-1.31

0.1920

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=6.93

DF=2

p-value=0.0312

LR/NI
Information (  )

-0.0054

0.0024

59

-2.27

0.0270

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

0.0003

0.0002

59

1.35

0.1824

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=7.31

DF=2

p-value=0.0259

LR/FI
Information (  )

-0.0069

0.0013

75

-5.34

0.0000

(Auction_no-10) (  1 )

0.0007

0.0002

75

2.98

0.0039

H0:

 = 1 =0

Wald statistic=34.89

DF=2

p-value=0.0000

Legend: SR: Small range of uncertainty treatment, LR: Large range of uncertainty treatment, NI: No
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment
Caption: Actual efficiency is statistically significantly different from the Nash prediction for both SR and
LR under different information treatments. Relative to Nash efficiency prediction, actual efficiency rises
along with auction number for LR/FI (p-value of hypothesis  1 =0 is 0.0039).
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics and Test Results for the Average Number of Reentries per

Bidder per Auction
SR/FI

SR/NI

LR/FI

LR/NI

Mean

0.19

0.12

0.77

0.16

Standard Deviation

0.17

0.11

0.97

0.08

p-value (one sided Wilcoxon

0.0313

0.0313

0.0625

0.0625

Signed-Rank Test)
Ha:Number of reentries >0

Legend: SR: Small range of uncertainty treatment, LR: Large range of uncertainty treatment, NI: No
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment
Caption: The null hypothesis that the number of reentries in small range of uncertainty treatment equals
zero is rejected at a 5% level. The null hypothesis that the number of reentry in large range of uncertainty
equals zero is rejected at a 10% level.
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Figure 3: Average Normalized Profit for Winners with (w/) and without (w/o) Reentry
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Legend: SR: Small range of uncertainty treatment, LR: Large range of uncertainty treatment, NI: No
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment
Caption: Normalized profit (actual profit – Nash predicted profit) is averaged across all auctions and all
sessions for winners. Winners who have reenter at least one time are classified into the w/ reentry category,
otherwise they are classified into the w/o reentry category. The average normalized profit for winners w/
reentry is found to be higher than that of the average normalized profit for winners w/o reentry only in
LR/FI.
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Appendix

Bidder’s Screen Shot

Caption: This is a capture of bidder 1‟s screen.
and signal of the common value of 513.

The bidder is in auction 1 and he has a private value of 498

If the bidder uses is common value of signal of 513 as the

estimate of the average of the common value signals his expected total value would be 1011. At the
current price of 966 Bidder 1 is still demanding a unit and at the past price of 965 bidders 1, 2, 3 and 4 were
also demanding the unit. Bidder 1 also has current cash account of 50, so that if the experiment ended
with no further allocation to Bidder 1, he would make 50 e-dollars.
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Instruction (small range of uncertainty, bidding information provided)
Welcome! You are going to participate in a decision experiment. The instructions for this
experiment are simple. If you understand the instructions, you will be able to earn a considerable
amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. In the following instructions, you will be
presented with some basic information followed by the market rules in this experiment. Raise you
hand whenever you have question about the instructions.
In this experiment, a series of market periods will be conducted. In each period, one hypothetical
object will be sold. There are four participants in the market.
In each period, each market participant receives an individual value and a group value signal for
the object. These are your private information. Do not reveal them to other participants.
Individual value is a number drawn between, and including, 475 and 525. Every whole number in
this range is equally likely to be your individual value.
Group value signal is a number drawn between, and including, 475 and 525. Every whole number
in this range is equally likely to be your group value signal.
Group value, which is the same for all participants, is the average of all participants‟ group value
signals (This number will be rounded to 1 decimal place).
Your true value of the object = group value + individual value.
Example 1:
Player ID

Group Value Signal

Individual Value

True Value

1

476

523

523+497.5=1020.5

2

489

486

486+497.5=983.5

3

502

490

490+497.5=987.5

4

523

510

510+497.5=1007.5

The group value of the object will be (476+489+502+523)/4=497.5.

Only one participant will be allocated with the object in each period. The participant who is
allocated with the object will receive his true value – price paid. If the price paid is higher
than your true value, you will make a loss. Participants who are not allocated with the object in a
period earn zero for that period.
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Example 1 Continues…
If the price is 1000 and Player 1 is the winner, his profit is 1020.5-1000=20.5 (a profit of 20.5).
If the price is 1000 and Player 2 is the winner, his profit is 983.5-1000=-16.5 (a loss of 16.5).
If the price is 1000 and Player 3 is the winner, his profit is 987.5-1000=-12.5 (a loss of 12.5).
If the price is 1000 and Player 4 is the winner, his profit is 1007.5-1000=7.5 (a profit of 7.5).

The currency used in the experiment is called e-dollar. At the beginning of the experiment, each
participant will be allocated with 50 e-dollars in their money balance. Any earning in the
experiment will be added to (if it is positive) or subtracted from (if it is negative) the money
balance.
At the end of the experiment, e-dollar will be converted to US dollar at a rate of US$1= 2 e-dollars.
In other words, if you have 20 e-dollars in your money balance, you earn US$10.
We will keep checking your money balance throughout the experiment. If your money balance is
less than or equal to zero, you will not be allowed to participate in the experiment. You are free to
leave the lab and you will be paid with your show-up fee.
Here is a summary of how you will be paid at the end of this experiment:
If your money balance is greater than zero
Total Earnings = Show up Fee+ Money balance in terms of US dollar
If your money balance is less than or equal to zero
Total Earnings = Show up Fee
To avoid making negative profit, keep in mind that period profit = Winner’s true value –
price paid
Rules
Each participant in a market period will be randomly allocated Player ID 1, 2, 3 or 4. After a
period is started, your individual value, group value signal and the current price of the object will
be displayed on the screen. 15 seconds after a period is started, the price will start to rise at the rate
of 1 unit per half second. Through out the period, participants can choose to demand or not to
demand the object through two radio buttons. In every second, the system will check the number
of demand at the current price. If the number of demand is more than 1, the current price continues
to go up. If the number of demand equals to 1, the period ends and the object will be allocated to
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the remaining bidder at the current price. If the number of demand equals to 0, the period ends and
the system will randomly allocate the object to one of the participants who were demanding at the
last price. Through out the period, participants will be informed the identity of participants
demanding at each price.

Note: Talking or any form of communication is not allowed in this experiment. If the
experimenter finds any of these, the experiment will be stopped and all subjects will only be
paid with their show up fee.
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